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Abstract
We clarify the respective roles fixed points, diagonalization, and self-
reference play in proofs of Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem.
The character of a Festschrift, I understand, allows for personal recollections of the
honoree, so indulge me when I start out with a few of those . . .
It must have been 1998–99—Volker Halbach had joined our ranks in 1997 and
we had started our weekly logic colloquium with Ulf Friedrichsdorf, a colleague in
mathematics—when I stepped into Wolfgang’s office and saw a copy of Boolos’ The
Logic of Provability on his desk. Me: “Oh, what’s this about?” Wolfgang: “I want
to check out what you guys are doing,” followed by an impromptu sketch of his own
completeness proof for modal logic he had devised while still being a graduate student
but never published. I do not know whether he liked the book; I never asked. But
there was another area where I remember Wolfgang ready to defend the importance of
diagonalization, namely, in the philosophy of language and here in particular Kaplan’s
explication of intensions as diagonals of characters.
Despite my sustained interest in formal methods, I have never been able to ignore
what makes philosophy a discipline in the humanities. That was one of the reasons
to write my Habilitation on a historical topic. It speaks to Wolfgang’s greatness as
a person that he tolerated my heresy. Later, however, he would force me to speak
on Bayesianism and the catch-all problem at my Habilitationskolloquium to find out
whether all was lost; he probably concluded it was.
So, when I was sifting through potential topics for my contribution, anything even
remotely historical or in a humanistic vein was out of the question and diagonalization
came out on top as something we share an interest in. I developed the line of thought
presented below in response to a blog post by Richard Zach and an unpublished draft
by Richard Heck, included it to a lecture once, but would otherwise not have taken the
time to write it up. I am therefore grateful to the editors for giving me an incentive
to do so. True to its character as an incidental piece, I suppress almost all scholarly
references; they can be found in Buldt 2014.
∗Uncorrected draft. Final version in Wolfgang Freitag et al., Von Rang und Namen.
Essays in Honour of Wolfgang Spohn, Mu¨nster: mentis (2016), 47–63 (page numbers
tentative).
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1 Introduction
Despite the fact that generations of researchers have vetted Go¨del’s result,
there are some still who harbor a lurking suspicion that his incompleteness
proof flirts with paradox or claim it to be one. Graham Priest, for example,
built the entire cottage industry of paraconsistent logic and dialetheism on
his initial analysis that a formally undecidable Go¨del sentence is both true
and false. But whether we look to Priest or others, the prime suspect to have
facilitated the crime of paradox is always the allegedly self-referential Go¨del
sentence stating “I’m not provable.” Some logicians tried to remove the
aura of paradox by eliminating self-reference or by making its mechanisms
more transparent. Many, however, continued to use “self-reference” in highly
visible places like book titles despite the fact that we do not seem to have
a good grasp of how to make the intuitive idea of self-reference sufficiently
precise in formal contexts. Others take offense at diagonalization, intimating
that it amounts to “black magic” (Soare) or at least is “intuitively unclear”
(Kotlarski). Oftentimes the issue is further compounded by a somewhat
loose language, which leaves unclear what “Go¨del’s incompleteness proof”
really refers to.
What I hope to achieve in this paper, then, is to alleviate the situation
just sketched by clarifying the respective roles fixed points, diagonalization,
and self-reference play in Go¨del’s proof. This, I hope, will also refute the
allegation that Go¨del skates on the thin ice of paradox or that diagonaliza-
tion is unintuitive. The exposition is organized around four claims: (i) the
importance of fixed points; (ii) diagonalization as the technique of choice
for fixed point construction; (iii) self-reference as a means for fixed point
construction; (iv) distinctness of all three (e. g., diagonalization must not
result in fixed points or fixed points not be self-referential).
2 Disclaimer
There is a robust consensus among logicians that Go¨del’s first theorem,
properly conceived, is not a result in proof theory (in whose context it was
first formulated) but a result in computability or recursion theory. There,
its informal version reads:
For every effective method that generates only true sentences of
arithmetic we can effectively determine a true sentence that this
method cannot generate.
This statement, translated into the language of recursion theory, becomes,
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The set of (Go¨del numbers of) all true arithmetical sentences is
productive.
Let a Go¨del numbering be given and TA be True Arithmetic, here under-
stood to be the set of Go¨del numbers of all true arithmetical sentences.
Productivity means that there is a total computable function f such that
whenever i is the index of a computable subset Wi of TA: Wi ⊆ TA, then
f(i) lies in Wi’s complement relative to TA: f(i) ∈ TA\Wi. In other words,
f(i) is the Go¨del number of a true arithmetical sentence (since it is in TA)
but not generated by the ith method (since it is not in Wi).
Thus, any proof theoretic version of Go¨del’s first theorem becomes an
instance of this more general result for one particular vehicle of calculation,
viz., the formal system encoded by the index i.
To my knowledge no one has yet argued that f(i) is the Go¨del number
of both a true and a false sentence. And while this may raise concerns
about the legitimacy of claims put forward by Priest and others, we also
understand that if the mountain will not come to Muhammad, Muhammad
will go to the mountain. This is why in the sections to follow we meet the
infidels where they dwell, among the proof theoretic versions of Go¨del’s first
theorem.
3 Preliminaries
This section can be safely skipped by everyone, who does not need a reminder
of selected basic facts, for all we do in this section is fix some terminology
and notation.
3.1 Formal Systems
Conceive of a formal system F as a system of fully formalized axiomatic
reasoning. To be more specific, we identify a formal system F with a triple
〈L,Σ, R〉, where L is a formal language, Σ ⊆ L is a set of axioms, possibly
empty, and R is a set of (logic) rules defined over L. We require all three
components to be effectively given, viz., language and rules are effectively
decidable (i. e., recursive) and the axioms can be effectively listed (i. e., re-
cursively enumerable, which, by Craig’s well-known theorem, means Σ can
chosen to be primitive recursive).
We call an expression ϕ derivable or formally provable in F iff there is
a finite sequence of expressions,
ψ1, ψ2, ψ3, . . . , ψn,
3
of which it is the terminal element, i. e., ϕ ≡ ψn, and such that each ψi is
either an axiom, α ∈ Σ, or results from the application of a rule, ρ ∈ R, to
earlier expressions in said sequence. We write ‘`F ϕ ’ iff ϕ is derivable in
F and ‘ d`F ϕ ’ to denote a specific derivation d of ϕ.
3.2 Encoding
Assume given a Go¨del numbering of F , viz., an encoding that assigns each
basic character of the language L and its syntactic entities (e. g., terms, ex-
pressions) unique natural numbers. We write ‘gn(x)’ for the Go¨del number
assigned to object x. Based on this encoding, define a stock of primitive
recursive relations that are true for natural numbers iff a certain syntac-
tic fact is true for the objects they encode. In particular assume given a
primitive recursive relation ProofF (n,m) such that,
ProofF (n,m) iff n = gn(d`F ϕ) and m = gn(ϕ).
Consequently,
∃xProofF (x, gn(ϕ)) iff `F ϕ.
We suppress the bound variable and write,
PrF (gn(ϕ)) iff `F ϕ.
We call ‘PrF (x)’ a provability predicate. Note that it is at least Σ1 due to
its existential quantifier.
3.3 Representation
We now consider how things look “inside” the formal system F . For this
purpose we assume the language of F to be or to contain the language
of arithmetic, viz., we have available (directly or via interpretation) the
symbols ‘0’ (zero), ‘S’ (successor), ‘+’ (plus), and ‘×’ (times). The canonical
way to represent a natural number ‘n’ in the formal language L is via the
numeral ‘n:’
n :≡ S . . . S︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
0.
By extension, we write for arithmetical terms: t :≡
t times︷ ︸︸ ︷
S . . . S 0. Finally, it
helps perspicuity to have a special notation for numerals that represent
Go¨del numbers:
pϕq :≡ S . . . . . . S︸ ︷︷ ︸
gn(ϕ) times
0.
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Aside. Here and elsewhere we use ‘=’ to denote ordinary equality and ‘≡’
to denote the syntactic identity of strings of symbols; we prefix either one
with a colon in case they hold by definition. Single apostrophes have no
meaning, they are used as spacing devices to help legibility.
Assume the formal system F to contain (directly or via interpretation)
the axioms of what is called Robinson’s Arithmetic Q—viz., the six Peano-
Dedekind axioms that define successor, addition, and multiplication plus a
seventh axiom stating that any number is zero or a successor. For all such
systems we can establish that any recursive fact that is true (or false) can
also be derived in F (or its negation can).
Fact 1. Assume F to contain Q and to be consistent. For every recursive re-
lationR(x1, . . . , xk) there is a corresponding formal expression ϕR(x1, . . . , xk)
in the language of F such that, for all n ∈ N,
R(n1, . . . , nk) ⇔ `F ϕR(n1, . . . , nk),
not-R(n1, . . . , nk) ⇔ `F ¬ϕR(n1, . . . , nk).
Remark. The presence of Q guarantees the left-to-right direction ‘⇒’ in the
two equivalences, consistency their reverse. Note how we use sans-serif font
to communicate formal expressions in the language of F .
From Fact 1 follows immediately,
Corollary 1. Assume F to be as in Fact 1. For the primitive recursive proof
relation ProofF (x, y) there is a corresponding formal expression ProofF(x, y)
in the language of F such that, for all n ∈ N,
ProofF (n,m) ⇔ `F ProofF(n,m),
not-ProofF (n,m) ⇔ `F ¬ProofF(n,m).
By adding the existential quantifier to the mix, we can extend these results
and arrive at Σ1-completeness and Σ1-soundness of the formal system F
(i. e., completeness and soundness in respect to all expressions, recursive or
formal, with at most one existential quantifier in front).1 This then allows
1The situation is more complex than it was before since simple consistency does no
longer suffice as it did for Fact 1 to secure the direction from right-to-left, i. e., soundness;
or, in the current case, Σ1-soundness. This is the reason why Go¨del introduced the concept
of ω-consistency, which Rosser circumvented again by building it right into the provability
predicate. We ignore these issues here; the curious reader may turn to (Buldt 2014, § 2.1).
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us to reason as follows:
`F ϕ `F ϕ
⇓ ; by definition of Pr(x) ⇑ ; by definition of Pr(x)
PrF (gn(ϕ)) PrF (gn(ϕ))
⇓ ; by Σ1-completeness ⇑ ; by Σ1-soundness
`F PrF(pϕq) `F PrF(pϕq)
which gives us as a corollary the adequacy (i. e., completeness and soundness)
of the formal system in respect to a formalized provability predicate:
Corollary 2. (AFP) `F ϕ ⇔ `F PrF(pϕq).
4 Go¨del’s Proof
Assume a formal system to satisfy,
(AFP) `F ϕ ⇔ `F PrF(pϕq),
and the fixed point equivalence (FPE), viz., the existence of a sentence γ ∈ L
such that,
(FPE) `F γ ↔ ¬PrF(pγq).
The formal undecidability of the fixed point γ, and hence the incompleteness
of the formal system F , follows then immediately from the properties of γ as
per FPE in conjunction with AFP. The proof (sketched below) assumes F to
be consistent (indicated by “con F” where it kicks in) and is by contradiction
(indicated by the symbol “ ” when reached).
`F γ AFP⇒ `F PrF(pγq) FPE⇒ `F ¬γ conF⇒  ⇒ 6`F γ.
`F ¬γ FPE⇒ `F PrF(pγq) AFP⇒ `F γ conF⇒  ⇒ 6`F ¬γ.
For our purposes this sketch is sufficiently close to Go¨del’s original proof.
The fixed point equivalence, FPE, is what the remainder of the paper is
about. Before we can proceed, however, a clarification seems in order.
There are many different ways to establish Go¨del’s incompleteness result.
Some are fairly robust (i. e., transfer easily from one system to another),
some are tailored for one specific formal system. For example, there are
model theoretic proofs that require the absence of induction while others
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require its presence. This raises the question of what proof exactly we refer
to when we speak of “Go¨del’s incompleteness proof.” The two extreme
options “all proofs” and “Go¨del’s original proof” are not helpful for obvious
reasons.
There are two features that distinguish Go¨del’s original proof. First,
specifications for the formal system F are known to be demonstrably min-
imal: F must allow for representation and be somewhat sound (i. e., what
we summed up in AFP). Making minimal demands results in a proof that
applies to the widest possible class of formal systems where it matters as
little as possible whether the language is rich or poor, the rules are strong
or weak, the axioms powerful or not. We shall say, “the proof scales well,”
to catch this property. Second, the proof itself relies on fixed points (i. e.,
FPE above). In Go¨del’s original proof this made the formally undecidable
sentence to have lowest quantificational complexity possible, viz., it was Π1
(i. e., one universal quantifier in prenex normal form). We shall say, “the
proof is optimal,” when this is the case.
Guided by those two properties, we call every proof P , which scales well
and is optimal, “Go¨del’s incompleteness proof.” The recoined phrase now
designates an informally characterized equivalence class, if you will. And the
justification for calling it so is that all proofs in this class actually proceed
by minor variations of the proof sketched above (see Buldt 2014, § 2). This
is why the following observations apply to the entire class.
5 Proof of the Fixed Point Equivalence
Go¨del’s original fixed point construction proceeded in three step (roughly)
as follows.
Step 1: Substitution
• Fix a certain individual variable of your choice; say ‘u.’
• Define a substitution function sub that mirrors the substitution of the
replacee variable ‘u’ for a replacer term ‘t,’
ϕ[u] tu ≡ ϕ(t),
but in the realm of Go¨del numbers. In short:
sub(x, y) :=
{
gn(ϕ[u] tu) if x = gn(ϕ(u)) and y = gn(t)
x otherwise.
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• Note that sub(x, y) is primitive recursive and therefore represented in
F by an expression ϕs(x, y).
Step 2: Definitions
• Define ϕ(u) :≡ ∀x[¬ProofF(x, sub(u, u))].
• Define p := gn(ϕ(u)).
• Substitute p for u in ϕ(u) to obtain γ, viz.,
γ :≡ ϕ(p) ≡ ∀x[¬ProofF(x, sub(p, p))].
• Calculate sub(p, p) = sub(gn(ϕ(u)), p) ; def. p
= gn
(
ϕ[u]pu
)
; def. sub
= gn
(
ϕ(p)
)
; substitution
= gn(γ) ; def. γ
Step 3: Derivation.
• Recall Step 2: sub(p, p) = gn(γ).
• Reason inside F .
`F ¬PrF(x)↔ ¬PrF(x) ; logic
`F ¬PrF(sub(p, p))↔ ¬PrF(pγq) ; Step 2
`F ∀x
[¬ProofF(x, sub(p, p))]↔ ¬PrF(pγq) ; def. PrF
`F ϕ(p)↔ ¬PrF(pγq) ; def. ϕ(p)
`F γ ↔ ¬PrF(pγq) ; def. γ

Remark. Go¨del assumed a formal system in which induction is available.
This can be used to prove that expressions ϕf(~x ) ∈ L, which represent a
function f(~x) in F , can actually be brought into the functional normal form
of terms ϕf(~x ) = y which is presupposed in step 2 of the derivation. One
can do without this convenience, but the argument, although it remains the
same, gets cluttered by longer expressions and longer derivations. The same
is true for Tarski’s suggestion to use a diagonalization function diag(x) :=
gn(x(pxq)), with x = gn(ϕ(u))—which amounts to skipping the substitution
function because sub(x, x) = diag(x).
The proof seems to work by black magic (a common joke about its twin,
8
the recursion theorem), and sometimes even seasoned logicians admit to
being baﬄed by and therefore not liking it. We wish to show that this is a
misapprehension and that under closer scrutiny the magic turns out to be
nothing but mundane diagonalization. But before we can do that, we need
to rehash diagonalization.
6 Diagonalization
Diagonalization may mean slightly different things in different contexts.
The primary meaning for our purpose derives from arranging an at most
countable set of objects, A = {a0, a1, a2, . . .}, in a two-dimensional array,
A = {aij}i,j∈ω, according to rows, Ri, and columns, Cj , as follows:
C0 C1 Cn
R0 a00 a01 . . . a0n . . .
R1 a10 a11 . . . a1n . . .
...
...
. . .
...
Rn an0 an1 . . . ann . . .
...
...
...
. . .
Note that the double index “ij,” which indicates the location on the grid, is
different from the index used previously in “A = {a0, a1, a2, . . .}” to differ-
entiate otherwise unspecified objects from one another. In other words, in
the array above we suppress the ‘k’ as in ‘akij .’
We call a function f : A→ A a sequence transforming function and write
‘F ’ when it is applied to each element of a sequence S = 〈a0, . . . , an, . . .〉
and thus transforms S into the sequence F (S) = 〈f(a0), . . . , f(an), . . .〉.
Furthermore, we call the sequence 〈a00, a11, a22 . . . , ann, . . .〉 in an array A
the diagonal and abbreviate it ‘D.’
Let an array A be given and F be a sequence transforming function. Apply
F to the diagonal D in A to get what is called the anti-diagonal D′.
D′ := F (D) = 〈f(a00), f(a11), f(a22), . . . , f(ann), . . .〉.
One out of two things can happen.
1. D′ is identical to one of the rows in A; viz., F (D) = Ri, for some i
such that Ri ∈ A.
2. D′ is not identical to any of the rows in A; viz., F (D) 6= Ri, for all i
such that Ri ∈ A.
9
If the latter case applies, we say that A is not closed under F , and what we
have is Cantor’s diagonal argument showing that a certain sequence is not
in A. In other words, we have “diagonalized out” (sc., of A). We will not
be interested in this case.
If, however, what obtains is the first case and D′ is identical to one of
the rows, viz., for some i: F (D) = Ri, then A closed under F and F has
fixed points. To see this, first observe that the identities D′ = F (D) = Ri
are defined as element-wise identity. That is, D′ = Ri iff
f(a00) = ai0, f(a11) = ai1, . . . , f(aii) = aii, . . . , f(ann) = ain, . . .
or, depicted more visually,
D′ = F (D) = 〈f(a00), f(a11), . . . , f(aii), . . . , f(ann), . . . 〉
= = = =
Ri = 〈 ai0, ai1, . . . , aii, . . . , ain, . . . 〉
If we highlight, in A, the anti-diagonal D′ as the row Ri it is identical
with, then it becomes apparent that F must have (at least) the fixed point
f(aii) = aii.
C0 C1 Ci Cn
R0 a00 a01 . . . a0i . . . a0n . . .
R1 a10 a11 . . . a1i . . . a1n . . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
F (D) = Ri
fa00
= ai0
fa11
= ai1
. . . faii= aii . . .
fann
= ain
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
Rn an0 an1 . . . ani . . . ann . . .
We now have the prerequisites to show that γ ↔ ¬PrF(pγq) is an instance
of f(aii) = aii for suitable chosen A and F .
7 Fixed Points and Diagonalization
According to the previous section, all we need to do is find suitable choices
for A and F .
We construct the set of objects, which to lay out in the array A, in three
steps. In Step 1 we choose all first-order expressions with the free variable
‘u:’
A = {ϕ0(u), ϕ1(u), ϕ2(u), . . .}.
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In Step 2 we form the set of all of their Go¨del numbers:
B = {pϕ0(u)q, pϕ1(u)q, pϕ2(u)q, . . .}.
In Step 3 we systematically plug all members of B into the free variable
slots of all members of A. Let pϕbq denote an arbitrary element of B and
ϕa(u) an arbitrary element of A; then our new set C consists of all elements
ϕa(pϕbq), for all a, b. We write ‘ϕab’ instead of ‘ϕa(pϕbq).’
The set C is what we construct our array A from. We lay out the
elements of C in such a way that A determines the rows and B the columns
which gives us:
pϕ0q pϕ1q pϕnq
ϕ0 ϕ00 ϕ01 . . . ϕ0n . . .
ϕ1 ϕ10 ϕ11 . . . ϕ1n . . .
...
...
. . .
...
ϕn ϕn0 ϕn1 . . . ϕnn . . .
...
...
...
. . .
Note that the diagonal sequence {ϕxx}x∈ω corresponds to the substitution
function sub(x, x) we used in the fixed point construction of Section 5. We
may call this the “first diagonalization.”
Next up is to find a suitable transformation F .
(1) Observe that the provability predicate ¬PrF(u) is itself a member of
the first set we started out with: A = {ϕ0, ϕ1, ϕ2, . . .}. Thus, there is an
index i such that ϕi ≡ ¬PrF(u).
(2) Apply the transformation f : ϕab 7→ ¬PrF(ϕab). Because of (1), f
maps C onto C, C will be closed under f (and A under F ), and each image
¬PrF(ϕab) must be a ϕin, for some n. (The first index i is the one from (1).)
(3) We saw in the previous section that closure implies fixed points.
Hence, F (D) has a fixed point ϕii. Inspection then shows that ϕii corre-
sponds to the expression γ ≡ ϕ(p) we used in the fixed point construction
of Section 5. We may call this the “second diagonalization.”
We thus find that fixed points in formal systems of arithmetic are not the
result of black magic nor do they defy our intuitive grasp. Rather, fixed
points owe their existence to the fact that certain sets, such as C, are closed
under suitable transformations. And the entire procedure—basically, a dou-
ble (first and second) diagonalization—is entirely syntactic in nature and at
no point employs a semantic concept.
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8 Varieties of Self-Reference
The original sin was committed by Go¨del (1931) himself when he, trying
to ease readers into accepting the paper’s results and provide them with an
intuitive grasp, wrote, “We therefore have before us a proposition that says
about itself that it is not provable.” But it is difficult to see how a Go¨del
sentence γ, which satisfies the fixed point equivalence,
(FPE) `F γ ↔ ¬PrF(pγq),
is supposed to accomplish that. For all FPE states is a truth-functional
equivalence. But any two true arithmetical sentences, say, ‘1+1 = 2’ and ‘2×
3 = 6,’ are truth-functionally equivalent without implying anything about
what they “say,” viz., their meaning. In short, truth-functional equivalence
is a far car from meaning equivalence. We should also recall the fact that
a fixed point such as γ is not a uniquely determined expression but just
one among infinitely many equivalent fixed points. This is the price we
pay for working with an extensional logic that cares about one thing and
one thing only, truth values. Despite these reservations, we briefly discuss
two approaches that were thought to have some promise for speaking about
self-reference.
8.1 Propertual self-reference
We use the mock word “propertual”—meaning, “pertaining to properties”—
to have a catchy counterpart to the more established adjective “objectual,”
which the next subsection will be about. (I considered calling it semantic
and syntactic self-reference but, while not completely off, felt those two
not quite capture what I wanted them to convey.) Thus, propertual self-
reference occurs when a sentence expresses a property it itself has. It seems
straightforward to work this idea out.
Step 1. Identify a property P with its corresponding set P = {x : P(x)},
and identify P’s definition (sc., relative to a structure A) with a suitable
open formula ϕ(u) that is true (sc., in A) exactly for the elements of P . Let
‘#x’ denote a name of x in the language of A. Then we have,
ϕ(u) A-defines P iff x ∈ P ⇔ A |= ϕ(#x).
Step 2. Adopt a naming convention, which somehow derives a property’s
name from its definition, and suppose names to be terms in the language.
Regarding the above sketch, for instance, the Go¨del number of the defining
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expression would fit the bill. Let ‘#ϕ(u)’ be such a name. Then we can
define propertual self-reference as follows.
Definition. (Propertual Self-Reference) It is an instance of propertual self-
reference iff
1. ϕ(u) is an expression, which A-defines property P, and
2. A |= ϕ(#ϕ(u)).
In such cases we say the expression ‘ϕ(#ϕ(u))’ is (propertually) self-refe-
rential, or, to have the property it expresses.
Step 3. Adopt a naming convention that allows Go¨del numbers to be names.
Let N be the standard model of arithmetic and observe that ¬PrF(u) N-
defines unprovability in F . Then it is easy to see that, since 6`F ¬PrF(u),
the expression ‘¬PrF(p¬PrF(u)q)’ is self-referential in the sense just defined.
The problem with this idea in our context is that no one knows how to tie
all this to fixed points. Suppose we have a fixed point equivalence,
`F ψ ↔ ϕψ,
whose right-hand side, ϕψ, can be shown to be propertually self-referential
like we did for ¬PrF(p¬PrF(u)q). What conditions would elevate ψ from
being merely truth-functionally equivalent (cf. the cautionary remarks made
at the beginning) to actually being self-referential the same way ϕψ is?
All known attempts to identify such conditions can be considered to have
failed, mostly because we do not yet have a good theory of self-reference
(see Halbach and Visser 2015).
8.2 Objectual self-reference
We arrive at a weaker notion of self-reference when we consider the require-
ment to express properties as excessive and superfluous baggage and instead
just ask whether or not it is permissible for an expression to contain its own
name: ϕ(#ϕ). Permissible could here be understood in various ways, say, as
to whether ϕ(#ϕ) is well-formed, or derivable, or true (which may already
cross a line—note our intention to force objectual self-reference to be an
almost syntactic notion). In short, can it happen that an expression refer-
ences itself as an object by containing its own name?
Definition. (Direct Objectual Self-Reference) It is an instance of direct
objectual self-reference iff an expression ϕ contains its own name: ϕ(#ϕ).
13
Instances that exemplify this kind of self-reference are Quine’s norm, where
an expression ϕ gets concatenated with its own quotation |ϕ| (here con-
sidered to be its name), viz., ϕ_|ϕ|, or expressions that contain their own
Go¨del number: ϕ(pϕq).
Like before, it is straightforward to check whether our new concept
applies to the fixed point γ from FPE. Recall that γ is shorthand for
∀x[¬ProofF(x, sub(p, p))], with p = gn(¬PrF(sub(u, u)). Thus, no direct ob-
jectual self-reference occurs in γ.
However, since sub(p, p) = gn(γ), we know that γ would be self-referential
if criteria would be more lax. This, relaxing standards, is what we try next.
Let ‘##ϕ’ denote an indirect name of ϕ. We say a little more on indirect
names below; for the time being think of them as definite descriptions or
functional expressions that, once they were evaluated, serve as a name.
Definition. (Indirect Objectual Self-Reference) It is an instance of indirect
objectual self-reference iff an expression ϕ contains its own indirect name:
ϕ(##ϕ).
Since sub(p, p) = gn(γ), the expression γ, which is ∀x[¬ProofF(x, sub(p, p))],
contains an indirect name of itself. Thus, γ is self-referential in the indirect
objectual sense.
Digression. Some (e. g., Heck 2007) are perfectly happy to embrace the last
point and call the Go¨del sentence γ self-referential and have it say “I’m not
provable.” I am not prepared to do that, and here is why: (1) γ does not
say “I” but refers to itself indirectly via a functional expression; (2) γ is true
iff γ is not formally provable. By itself, (2) is a raw datum about γ’s model
theoretic evaluation and the resulting truth value. As such, it is just another
equivalence (see what we said above, pp. 12f.) that implies nothing about
meaning or self-reference. And it doesn’t imply anything mostly because we
lack a theory of self-reference that would allow us to go a step further and
interpret this as an instance of self-reference. We have a hunch that it is,
but gut feelings are a poor substitute for an actual theory. Likewise for (1).
Let me further illustrate this point. My cat naps. By itself, this is a
raw datum. I can add, “the cat’s tired, that’s why.” But this is a cooked
up story unless I can back it up with actual science on pet behavior that
goes beyond my anthropocentric habit of ascribing pets intentional states.
Similar to our intentional stance towards pets (Dennett), all we currently
have on self-reference are deeply engrained semantic practices. But in both
cases we lack actual theories. The main challenge as I see it is therefore
as follows. All you can see from within the formal system are truth values,
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but no meaning and no self-reference. It is like inside the Matrix, just 0’s
and 1’s, or inside Searle’s Chinese Room, just rules-based symbol pushing.
But as humans we live and breathe meaning (whatever that is) and by our
own design (arithmetization) we can assign numbers a meaning they may
have for us; for instance, that they encode something. But like ascribing
pets intentional states does not mean they have them, ascribing numbers
self-reference does not mean they have it. In other words, teaching a formal
system self-reference is almost like teaching the Chinese Room to think. Ig-
noring this lacuna runs the risk of taking things to be understood that are
not and of not developing a theory where one is needed. (End of digression)
The naming business presented above was admittedly severely deficient and
in need of a much more rigorous treatment. It was based on an oversimpli-
fying account of how naming works in (some?) natural languages: proper
names refer directly while definite descriptions need some processing first.
Quite obviously, my goal was not to develop a theory. I just wanted to put
some quick stakes (i. e., examples) in the ground to show the lay of the land.
To me, the interesting thing about indirect objectual self-reference is not
whether it results from fixed point construction (it depends) or whether it
offers a promising general approach to self-reference (I doubt it). On the
contrary, the interesting thing to me is the exact opposite, namely, that it
can be used to construct fixed points.
8.3 Fixed points via self-reference
This approach, first suggested by Quine and subsequently elaborated by
Smullyan, uses the norm function. In what follows, all objects are strings
of symbols. We write a_b for the concatenation of two strings a, b. Strings
fall into two distinct classes; expressions ‘a’ and their quotations ‘|a|.’ Call
the norm of a the concatenation of a with its own quotation: a_|a|.
The intuition behind these definitions is what their names suggest. Thus,
if, “a ≡ don’t quote me on,” then, “|a| ≡ ‘don’t quote me on’,” and a’s
norm is, “a_|a| ≡ don’t quote me on ‘don’t quote me on’.”
Thus, objectual self-reference is not a rare occurence but built right into
the mechanics due to the presence of quotation. Ordinary self-reference is
easily achieved, too. Let a be “this is the norm of.” Then its norm is: “this
is the norm of ‘this is the norm of’.” But the first “this” refers to a_|a|,
which is indeed the norm of “this is the norm of,” and the norm refers to
itself. Other monstrosities come easy as well; truth-tellers, for example. Let
E (a set) and d (an expression) be as follows:
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d ≡ E contains the norm of _|E contains the norm of|.
Observe that d states that the norm of “E contains the norm of” is in E;
but that norm is d itself and hence d ∈ E if d is true. On the other hand, if
d is false, then d 6∈ E. Thus, d is true iff d ∈ E, and d is a truth-teller for
E (i. e., true iff in).
Note how the last example used the language of sets. This is crucial for a
smooth implementation and requires, in case of first-order theories, to extend
their language with class symbols. Doing without an extended language is
possible but requires a modified concept of normalization (what Smullyan
calls “near normalization”), which, then, is sensitive to the underlying set
of basic symbols (e. g., it won’t work with the Sheffer stroke). All these
complications are the reason not to go into any more detail.
Be the details as they may, the important point was to mention that
objectual self-reference as it is embodied in the norm operation can be used
to construct fixed points that satisfy FPE.
9 Concluding Remarks
We set out to clarify the respective roles fixed points, diagonalization, and
self-reference play in Go¨del’s proof (properly characterized, see § 4). Ac-
cordingly, we highlighted the crucial role fixed points play (§ 4) and then
disenchanted the alleged mystery of their existence by showing that they
result—and quite naturally so?—from a double diagonalization (§ 5, § 7).
Our treatment made clear, or so I hope, that nothing semantic enters the
picture and that self-reference in particular is totally absent. We then turned
to the concept of self-reference and concluded that as of now we do not have
at our disposal a theory that would allow us to reconstruct and justify the
intuitive hunches we have on this topic (§ 8.1–2). To round things off, we
mentioned in § 8.3 that in the disguise of normalization a syntactic form of
objectual self-reference can be used to construct fixed points. Taking it all
together, the highlighted interdependencies can be visualized as follows:
diagonalization ⇒ fixed points ⇐ (obj.) self-reference
⇓
incompleteness
What, then, one might be tempted to ask, is the crucial player in this
picture? We need to back up a bit in order for me to say where I believe a
good answer can be found.
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Let 2 = {0, 1} and 2N the set of all functions f : N → 2. Recall
that 2N has the cardinality of the powerset of N. Cantor used his famous
diagonal argument to prove that there is no surjective function f : N→ 2N.
Lawvere gave a category theoretic generalizations of this argument that,
boiled down again to the level of set theory, establishes roughly the following
claim. Let T and Y be sets and Y T be the set of functions from T to
Y . Then, if Y is appropriately well-behaved, there is no onto function
g : T → Y T (“diagonalizing out”). Or, in its contraposed form, if there
is such an onto function g, then all functions h : Y → Y have a fixed
point. Yanovsky (2003) shows how all the usual suspects (i. e., paradoxes
and limitative theorems) can be couched in terms of this framework and
then follow from the generalized Cantor theorem.
To help us wrap our brains around the result Yanovsky offers the fol-
lowing crutch. Note that 2N is the set of all characteristic functions and
thereby a set of properties elements of N may have. Similar for Y T and T .
The two versions of the theorem leave us hence with a choice: either the set
of properties is well-behaved but suffers limited expressibility, or properties
are completely expressible but show degenerated behavior in terms of fixed
points—an undesirable outcome either way.
This more general picture, if accurate, seems to align well with our much
more limited analysis: both put diagonalization in the driver’s seat—where
Wolfgang Spohn has been for the better part of his career.
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